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Abstract. By adding human-imperceptible noise to clean images, the
resultant adversarial examples can fool other unknown models. Features
of a pixel extracted by deep neural networks (DNNs) are influenced by
its surrounding regions, and different DNNs generally focus on different
discriminative regions in recognition. Motivated by this, we propose a
patch-wise iterative algorithm – a black-box attack towards mainstream
normally trained and defense models, which differs from the existing
attack methods manipulating pixel-wise noise. In this way, without sac-
rificing the performance of white-box attack, our adversarial examples
can have strong transferability. Specifically, we introduce an amplifi-
cation factor to the step size in each iteration, and one pixel’s over-
all gradient overflowing the -constraint is properly assigned to its sur-
rounding regions by a project kernel. Our method can be generally inte-
grated to any gradient-based attack methods. Compared with the cur-
rent state-of-the-art attacks, we significantly improve the success rate
by 9.2% for defense models and 3.7% for normally trained models on
average. Our code is available at https://github.com/qilong-zhang/
Patch-wise-iterative-attack
Keywords: Adversarial examples, Patch-wise, Black-box attack, Trans-
ferability
1 Introduction
In recent years, Deep neural networks (DNNs) [9,10,30,31,16,15] have made
great achievements. However, the adversarial examples [32] which are added
with human-imperceptible noise can easily fool the state-of-the-art DNNs to
give unreasonable predictions. This raises security concerns about those ma-
chine learning algorithms. In order to understand DNNs better and improve its
robustness to avoid future risks [6], it is necessary to investigate the defense
models, and meanwhile the generation of adversarial examples, e.g., [38].
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Various attack methods have been proposed in these years. One of the most
popular branches is gradient-based algorithms. For this branch, existing methods
can be generally classified as single-step attacks and iterative attacks. In general,
iterative attacks perform better than single-step attacks in the white-box set-
ting. But in the real world, attackers usually cannot get any information about
the target model, which is called the black-box setting. In this case, single-step
attacks always have a higher transferability than iterative attacks at the cost
of poor performance of substitute models. To sum up, the essential difference
between the two sub-branches is the number of iterations. Iterative attacks re-
quire multiple iterations to obtain the final perturbation noise, and hence there
is a risk of getting stuck in the local optimum during the iterations, reducing
the transferability. While single-step attack methods only update once, which is
easy to underfit but really improve the generalizability.
Moreover, with the development of attack methods, several adversarial ex-
amples have been applied to the physical world [20,6,12,29,33]. This has raised
public concerns about AI security. Consequently, a lot of defense methods are
proposed to tackle this problem. Lin et at. [18] propose defensive quantization
method to defend adversarial attacks while maintain the efficiency. Guo et al. [8]
use bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression [4], total variance minimization [26],
and image quilting [5] to preprocess inputs before they are feed to DNNs. Tramr
et al. [34] use ensemble adversarial training to improve the robustness of models.
Furthermore, Xie et al. [36] add feature denoising module into adversarial train-
ing, and the resultant defense models demonstrate greater robustness in both
white-box and black-box attack settings. To generate more effective adversarial
examples, it is necessary to study the properties of intrinsic classification logic
of the DNNs. Here we use class activation mapping [39] to analyze it. Zhou et
al. [39] observed that the discriminative regions always vary across predicted
labels. Recent research [3] also showed that different models focus on different
discriminative regions in recognition, and the defense models generally focus on
larger discriminative regions than the normally trained models. The discrimi-
native regions are often clustered together, as shown in Fig.1. Therefore, only
adding pixel-wise noise may hinder the transferability of adversarial examples
across different DNNs. Based on these observations, we argue that in addition
to reducing the responsiveness of the ground-truth regions while activating the
regions of any other categories, crafting perturbation with the characteristic
of aggregation in the above-discussed regions is also important. To that end,
we study the advantages and disadvantages of single-step and iterative attacks
[3,7,14], and we argue that linear nature of DNNs [7] does exist to some extent.
Therefore we amplify step size with a fixed factor to analyze the effect of step size
on transferability. Besides, we rethink the weakness of direct clipping operation
which discards partial gradient information. To alleviate this problem, we reuse
the cut noise and apply a heuristic project strategy to reduce the side effects of
direct clipping as well as generating patch-wise noise. Finally, combined with the
fast sign gradient method, we propose the Patch-wise Iterative Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (PI-FGSM) to generate strongly transferable adversarial
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Fig. 1. We show the adversarial examples generated by FGSM [7], I-FGSM [14] and our
method PI-FGSM for Inception V3 model [31] respectively. The maximum perturbation
 is limited to 16. On the left side of the figure, we use Inception V3 [31] and DenseNet-
161 [10] to show the Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) [28]
of the ground-truth label, and on the right side of the figure, we divide it into three
parts. Top row: the adversarial noise patch map (we define it in Sec. 3.2.1). Middle
row: the adversarial noise. Bottom row: the adversarial examples. Our PI-FGSM
can generate adversarial noise which has the same clustering property as the activation
map and also well covers the different discriminative regions.
examples. The visualization results in Fig. 1 also demonstrate our approach.
Compared with other methods, the noise generated by our PI-FGSM has obvi-
ous aggregation characteristics and can better cover varied discriminative regions
of different DNNs. Our major contributions can be summarized as: 1) We pro-
pose a novel patch-wise attack idea named PI-FGSM. Compared with existing
methods manipulating pixel-wise noise, our approach can have the advantage of
both single-step and iterative attacks, i.e., improving the transferability with-
out sacrificing the performance of the substitute model. 2) Technically, based on
the mature gradient-based attack pipeline, we adopt an amplification factor and
project kernel to generate more transferable adversarial examples by patch-wise
noise. Our method can be generally integrated to any iteration-based attack
methods; and 3) Extensive experiments on ImageNet show that our method
significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods, and improves the success
rate by 9.2% for defense models and 3.7% for normally trained models on average
in the black-box setting.
2 Related work
In this section, we briefly analyze the exiting adversarial attack methods, from
the perspectives of classification of adversarial examples, attack setting, and
ensemble strategy.
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2.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are first discovered by Szegedy et al.[32], which only added
subtle perturbation to the original image but can mislead the DNNs to make
an unreasonable prediction with unbelievably high confidence. To make matters
worse, adversarial examples also exist in physical world [6,12,13], which raises
security concerns about DNNs. Due to the vulnerability of DNNs, a large num-
ber of attack methods have been proposed and applied to various fields of deep
learning in recent years, e.g., object detection and semantic segmentation [35],
embodied agents [19], and speech recognition [1]. To make our paper more fo-
cused, we only analyze adversarial examples in the image classification task.
2.2 Attack Settings
In this section, we describe three common attack settings. The first is the white-
box setting where the adversary can get the full knowledge of the targeted mod-
els, thus obtaining accurate gradient information to update adversarial examples.
The second is the semi-black-box setting where the output of the targeted model
is available but model parameters are still unknown. For example, Papernot et
al. [24] train a local model with many queries to substitute for the target model.
Ilyas et al. [11] propose the variant of NES [27] to generate adversarial exam-
ples with limited queries. The rest is the black-box setting, where the adversary
generally cannot access the target model and adversarial examples are usually
generated for substitute models without exception. That is why transferability
plays a key role in this setting. Recently, the black-box attack is a hot topic
and many excellent works have been proposed. Xie et al. [37] apply random
transformations to the input images at each iteration to improve transferability.
Dong et al. [2] propose a momentum-based iterative algorithm to boost ad-
versarial attacks. Besides, the adversarial examples which are crafted by their
translation-invariant attack method [3] can evade the defenses with effect. How-
ever, the above works cannot generate powerful patch-wise noise because they
generally take valid gradient information into account. In this paper, our goal
is crafting efficient patch-wise noise to improve the transferability of adversarial
examples in the black-box setting.
2.3 Ensemble Strategy
There are two well-known but totally different strategies for this topic. One
strategy uses an ensemble of legitimate examples to update only one univer-
sal adversarial perturbation. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [23] propose an iterative
attack method to generate such perturbations which cause almost all images
sampled from the data distribution to be misclassified. Another strategy uses an
ensemble of models to get a better estimate of the gradient information. Liu et
al. [21] propose novel ensemble-based approaches that attacking multiple models
to generate adversarial examples. In this way, the adversarial examples are less
likely to get stuck in the local optimum of any specific model, thus improving
transferability.
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3 Methodology
In this section, we describe our algorithm in detail. Let xclean denote a clean ex-
ample without any perturbation and y denote the corresponding ground-truth
label. We use f(x) to denote the prediction label of DNNs, and xnoise to de-
note the human-imperceptible perturbation. The adversarial example xadv =
xclean + xnoise is visually indistinguishable from xclean but misleads the clas-
sifier to give a high confidence of a wrong label. In this paper, we focus on
untargeted black-box attack, i.e., f(xadv) 6= y. And the targeted version can be
simply derived. To measure the perceptibility of adversarial perturbations, we
follow previous works [2,3,37] and use l∞-norm here. Namely, we set the max ad-
versarial perturbation , i.e., we should keep ||xclean − xadv||∞ ≤ . To generate
our adversarial examples, we should maximize the cross-entropy loss J(xadv, y)
of the substitute models. Our goal is to solve the following constrained optimiza-
tion problem:
arg max
xadv
J(xadv, y), s.t. ||xclean − xadv||∞ ≤ . (1)
Due to the black-box setting, the adversary does not allow to analytically com-
pute the target models’ gradient ∇J(x, y). In the majority of cases, they use the
information of substitute models (i.e., official pre-trained models) to generate ad-
versarial examples. Therefore, it is very important to improve the transferability
of adversarial examples so that they still fool the black-box models successfully.
3.1 Development of Gradient-based Attack Methods
In this section, we give a brief introduction of some excellent works which are
based on the gradient sign method.
– Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Goodfellow et al. [7] argue that the
vulnerability of DNN is their linear nature. Consequently they update the
adversarial example by:
xadv = xclean +  · sign(∇xJ(xclean, y)). (2)
where sign(·) indicates the sign operation.
– Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM): Kurakin et al. [14] use a
small step size α to iteratively apply the gradient sign method multiple
times. This method can be written as:
xadvt+1 = Clipxclean,{xadvt + α · sign(∇xJ(xadvt , y))}. (3)
where Clipxclean, denotes element-wise clipping, aiming to restrict x
adv
within the l∞-bound of xclean.
– Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-FGSM): Dong et al. [2]
use momentum term to stabilize update directions. It can be expressed as:
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
adv
t , y)
||∇xJ(xadvt , y)||1
, xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign(gt+1). (4)
where gt is cumulative gradient, and µ is the decay factor.
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– Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (DI2-FGSM): Xie et
al. [37] apply diverse input patterns to improve the transferability of ad-
versarial examples. With the replacement of Eq. (3) by:
xadvt+1 = Clipxclean,{xadvt + α · sign(∇xJ(D(xadvt ), y))}. (5)
where D(x) is random transformations to the input x. For simplicity, we use
DI-FGSM later.
– Translation-Invariant Attack Method : Dong et al. [3] convolve the gradient
with the pre-defined kernel W to generate adversarial examples which are
less sensitive to the discriminative regions of the substitute model. For TI-
FGSM, it is only updated in one step:
xadv = xclean +  · sign(W ∗ ∇xJ(xadvt , y)). (6)
and TI-BIM is its iterative version.
3.2 Patch-wise Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
In this section, we elaborate our method in details. We first introduce our moti-
vations in Sec. 3.2.1 and Sec. 3.2.2. In Sec. 3.2.3, we will describe our solution.
3.2.1 Patch Map. Natural images are generally made up of smooth patches
[22] and the discriminative regions are usually focused on several patches of them.
However, as demonstrated in Fig. 1, different DNNs generally focus on different
discriminative regions, but these regions usually contain clustered pixels instead
of scattered ones. Besides, Li et al. [17] have demonstrated that regionally homo-
geneous perturbations are strong in attacking defense models, which is especially
helpful to learn transferable adversarial examples in the black-box setting. For
this reason, we believe that noises with the characteristic of aggregation in these
regions are more likely to attack successfully because they perturb more sig-
nificant information. To better view the adversarial noise xnoise, we take the
absolute value of xnoise to define its patch map xmap3, which is done by:
xmap = |xnoise| × 256

. (7)
As shown in Fig. 1, compared with the patch map of I-FGSM, and FGSM, our
PI-FGSM can generate the noise with more obvious aggregation characteristics.
3.2.2 Box Constraint. To the best of our knowledge, almost all iterative
gradient-based methods apply projected gradient descent to ensure the pertur-
bation within the box. Although this method can improve the generalization of
3 Pixel values of a valid image are in [0, 255]. If the values are more than 255, they
will be modified into 0 for “uint8” type, to give better contrast.
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adversarial examples to some extent [23], it also has certain limitations. Let us
take the dot product D(·) as an example:
D(xadvt ) = wx
adv
t + b, D
′
(xadvt ) = w. (8)
where w denotes a weight vector and b denotes the bias. Then we add a noise
αw to update xadvt :
D(Clipxclean,{xadvt + αw}) ≈ D(xadvt ) + α2w2. (9)
If xadvt + αw excess the -ball of original image x
clean, the result is Eq.(9). Ob-
viously, α2<α due to element-wise clipping operation. If we adopt this strategy
directly, we will waste some of the gradient information and change the input
unexpectedly.
3.2.3 Our Method. From the above analysis, we observe that adding noise
in a patch-wise style will have better transferability than the pixel-wise style.
Also, the element-wise clipping operation of existing gradient-based attack meth-
ods will lose part of the gradient information and lead to unexpected changes.
Therefore, we propose our method, which follows the mature gradient-based
attack pipeline and tackles the above issues simultaneously.
To the best of our knowledge, many recent iterative attack methods [2,3,37]
set step size α = /T , where T is the total number of iterations. In such a
setting, we do not need the element-wise clipping operation, and the adversarial
examples can finally reach the  bound of xclean. This seems like a good way to
get around the above problem of direct clipping, but we notice that single-step
attacks often outperform iterative attacks in the black-box setting. To study the
transferability with respect to the step size setting, we make a tradeoff between
single large step and iterative small step by setting it to /T × β, where β is an
amplification factor.
The results in Fig. 2 show that iterative approaches with a large amplification
factor will help to avoid getting stuck in poor local optimum, thus demonstrating
a stronger attack towards black-box models. One possible reason is that attacks
with an amplification factor increase each element’s value of the resultant per-
turbation, thus providing a higher probability of misclassification due to the
linear assumption of Goodfellow et al. [7]. However, simply increasing the step
size does not get around the disadvantages of direct clipping operation, because
the excess noise would be eliminated.
Therefore, we propose a novel heuristic project strategy to solve this problem.
Our inspiration comes from Rosen Project Gradient Method [25]: by projecting
the gradient direction when the iteration point is on the edge of the feasible
region, the method ensures the iteration point remains within the feasible region
after updating. However, performing this method is a little complex and needs
additional computational cost. Hence we take a heuristic strategy to apply this
idea: just projecting the excess noise into the surrounding field. We argue that
the part of the noise vector which is more easy to break -ball limitation has
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Algorithm 1: PI-FGSM
Input : The cross-entropy loss function J of our substitute models;
iterations T ; L∞ constraint ; project kernel Wp; amplification
factor β(≥ 1); project factor γ; a clean image xclean (Normalized
to [-1,1]) and the corresponding groud-truth label y;
Output: The adversarial example xadv;
1 Initialize cumulative amplification noise a0 and cut noise C to 0;
2 xadv0 = x
clean;
3 for t← 0 to T do
4 Calculate the gradient ∇xJ(xadvt , y);
5 at+1 = at + β · T · sign(∇xJ(xadvt , y)); // Update at+1
6 if ||at+1||∞ ≥  then
7 C = clip(|at+1| − , 0,∞) · sign(at+1);
8 at+1 = at+1 + γ · sign(Wp ∗ C);
9 else
10 C = 0;
11 end
12 xadvt+1 = Clipxclean,{xadvt + β · T · sign(∇xJ(xadvt , y)) + γ · sign(Wp ∗C)};
13 xadvt+1 = clip(x
adv
t+1,−1, 1); // Finally clip xadvt+1 into [-1,1]
14 end
15 Return xadv = xadvT ;
a higher probability of being in the highlighted area of discriminative regions.
Our strategy can simply reuse the noise to increase the degree of aggregation in
these regions without additional huge computational cost.
The integration of patch-wise iterative algorithm and fast gradient sign method
(PI-FGSM) is summarized in Algorithm 1. Firstly, in line 5, we need to get the
cumulative amplification noise at. After amplification operation, if L∞-norm of
at exceeds the threshold , we update the cut noise C by:
C = clip(|at+1| − , 0,∞) · sign(at+1). (10)
where | · | denotes the absolute operation. Finally, unlike other methods, we add
an additional project term before restricting the L∞-norm of the perturbations.
Note that we do not abandon the clipping operation. Instead, we just reuse the
cut noise to alleviate the disadvantages of direct clipping, thus increasing the
aggregation degree of noise patches. More specifically, we update the adversarial
examples by:
xadvt+1 = Clipxclean,{xadvt + β ·

T
· sign(∇xJ(xadvt , y)) + γ · sign(Wp ∗C)}. (11)
where Wp is a special uniform project kernel of size kw × kw, and sign(Wp ∗C)
is cut noise’s “feasible direction”. In this paper, we simply define Wp as:
Wp[i, j] =
{
0, i = bkw/2c, j = bkw/2c.
1/(k2w − 1), else.
(12)
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We also test other types of kernels actually, e.g., Gaussian kernel. However,
experiment results show that there are no significant difference (only ∼1%).
Besides, the uniform kernel does not need extra parameters. Therefore we choose
it finally.
4 Experiment
4.1 Setup
Following the previous works [2,3], we also do our experiments on ImageNet-
compatible dataset4, which contains 1000 images and is used for NIPS 2017
adversarial competition. We choose eleven models to do these experiments. For
normally trained models, we consider Inception V3 (Inc-v3) [31], Inception V4
(Inc-v4) [30], Inception-ResNet V2 (IncRes-v2) [30] ResNet152 V2 (Res-152)
[9] and DenseNet 161 (Dense-161) [10]. For defense models, we include three
ensemble adversarial trained models: Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 and IncRes-v2ens
[34], and three more robust models from [37]: ResNet152 Baseline (Res152B),
ResNet152 Denoise (Res152D), ResNeXt101 DenoiseAll (ResNeXtDA) [36]. For
the sake of simplicity, we use NT to denote normally trained models, EAT to
denote ensemble adversarial trained models and FD to denote feature denoising
defense models (include Res152B). Noted that the reported success rate of FD
has subtracted the ratio of clean images that are predicted incorrectly by FD.
In addition, PI-FGSM can be easily combined with other attack methods (e.g.,
DI-FGSM [37]). To make the abbreviation unambiguous, we use the first char-
acter to denote the corresponding method. For instance, DPI-FGSM means the
integration of DI-FGSM with PI-FGSM.
In our experiment, we set equal weight when attacking an ensemble of models.
The maximum perturbation  is set to 16. The iteration T is set to 10 for all
iterative methods. For iterative methods without our amplification factor, the
step size is /T = 1.6. For MI-FGSM, we set the decay factor µ = 1.0; for TI-
FGSM and TI-BIM, we set the kernel size k = 15; and for DI-FGSM, we set the
transformation probability p = 0.7.
4.2 Amplification factor
In this section, we calculate the success rate of different amplification factors,
which are varied from 1 to 10. The results are shown in Fig. 2. In general,
a larger amplification factor does improve performance. Moreover, we observe
that when the amplification factor is large enough, further increasing it will
not bring significant improvement and may even reduce the transferability of
some attacks. For example, it is better not to use large amplification factor for
DI-FGSM, because this method applies random transformations to the input
images. If we set the amplification factor too large, the adversarial examples
4 https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/tree/master/examples/nips17_
adversarial_competition/dataset
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may deviate from the global optimum. In addition, a larger amplification factor
has no obvious effect for MI-FGSM, which also proves that the momentum term
can stabilize the update directions and avoid getting stuck in a poor local op-
timum. For our method, as the amplification factor increases, the success rate
will increase rapidly and outperform other approaches soon. If we set β = 1,
PI-FGSM degrades to I-FGSM because the cut noise has no effect anymore in
this setting. By comparing the growth curves of I-FGSM and PI-FGSM, we ob-
serve that our heuristic project strategy can improve the transferability by a
large margin, which fully validates the effectiveness of our method. We also ex-
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Fig. 2. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different amplification
factor β setting. The adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3 by FGSM, I-FGSM,
MI-FGSM, TI-BIM, TI-FGSM, DI-FGSM, PI-FGSM and their combined versions re-
spectively. Left Column: The result of NT, including Inc-v4, Res-152, IncRes-v2 and
Dense-161 but except Inc-v3; Middle Column: The result of EAT, including Inc-
v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 and IncRes-v2ens; Right Column: The result of FD, including
ResNeXtDA, Res152B and Res152D.
amine the influence of amplification factor on the combined methods and show
the results in Fig. 2. It can be observed that the optimal amplification factor
of combined methods is usually between the best β of the two methods. If one
of these methods’ performance is negatively correlated with the amplification
factor, then the combination with our method may not perform well (i.e., MPI-
FGSM vs. EAT). In our experiments, the project factor γ is set to /T · β in
most cases, therefore we only focus on the amplification factor in this ablation
study, specific parameter settings will be given in the later experiments.
4.3 Project Kernel Size
In fact, the function of the project kernel is to generate patch-wise noise. As
shown in Fig. 1, the noise patch map of PI-FGSM is larger and regular than
others. The results in Fig. 2 also demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
method. However, The size of the kernel Wp play an important role for trans-
ferability. From Fig. 3, we find the optimal size of project kernel is different for
NT, EAT and FD:
Patch-wise Attack 11
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Kernel Size Kw
50
60
70
80
90
100
Av
er
ag
e 
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e(
%
)
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Kernel Size Kw
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Inc-v3
Inc-v4
Res-152
IncRes-v2
Res152B
Res152D
ResNeXtDA
Ensemble of FD
Ensemble of NT
65.0
67.5
70.0
72.5
75.0
77.5
80.0
82.5
85.0
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Kernel Size Kw
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
Fig. 3. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different kernel size set-
tings. The adversarial examples are crafted for different substitute models respectively,
e.g., Inc-v3 (blue solid line). Left Column: The results of NT, including Inc-v3, Inc-v4,
Res-152, IncRes-v2 and Dense-161; Middle Column: The results of EAT, including
Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 and IncRes-v2ens; Right Column: The results of FD, including
ResNeXtDA, Res152B and Res152D.
– When transferring to NT, 3× 3 kernel is the best. Larger kernel size always
decreases the transferability in the black-box setting.
– When transferring to EAT, 7× 7 kernel can improve the transferability ob-
viously. But if we keep increasing the size, the success rate grows slowly and
even gets worse.
– When transferring to FD, if adversarial examples are generated for FD, 3×3
kernel is the best. And if we use NT to attack against FD, 21×21 is slightly
better.
Considering the difference between the NT, EAT and FD, we use 3 × 3 kernel
to attack against NT, 7× 7 for EAT and 21× 21 for FD if adversarial examples
are crafted for NT. Also, we use 3× 3 kernel to fool FD if adversarial examples
are generated for FD.
4.4 Attacks vs. Normally Trained Models
In this section, we focus on the vulnerability of NT. we set β = 10 (γ = 16)
for PI-FGSM and MPI-FGSM, and β = 2.5, γ = 2 for DMPI-FGSM and DPI-
FGSM. We compare PI-FGSM with FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DI-FGSM to
verify the effectiveness of our method. Moreover, we also test the performance
of the combination of different methods, e.g., MPI-FGSM. It should be noted
that we do not consider TI-BIM or TI-FGSM [3] here, because they focus more
on attacking the defense models.
The results are shown in Tab. 1. To sum up, compared with other attacks,
our PI-FGSM can improve the success rate by 3.7% on average, and when we
attack against Dense-1615, transferability can be increased by up to 17.2%.
5 Input size need to be [224,224,3], therefore we need resize adversarial examples whose
size is [299,299,3]
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Table 1. The success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks against NT. The leftmost column
models are substitute models (“*” indicates white-box attack), the adversarial examples
are crafted for them by FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DI-FGSM, PI-FGSM, and their
combined versions respectively.
Attacks Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161
Inc-v3
FGSM 80.9* 38.0 33.1 33.9 41.4
I-FGSM 100.0* 29.6 19.4 20.3 20.7
MI-FGSM 100.0* 54.1 43.5 50.9 45.8
DI-FGSM 99.8* 54.2 32.1 43.6 30.4
PI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0* 58.6 45.0 51.3 61.7
MPI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0* 63.0 50.6 60.0 59.0
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0* 73.1 51.2 67.4 55.9
DMI-FGSM 99.9* 78.9 63.9 75.6 60.7
DMPI-FGSM(Ours) 100.0* 81.8 63.4 77.1 63.7
Inc-v4
FGSM 45.4 75.1* 35.1 35.8 45.4
I-FGSM 43.3 100.0* 25.5 25.3 24.7
MI-FGSM 71.2 100.0* 52.4 59.0 51.2
DI-FGSM 66.6 100.0* 39.8 50.4 33.2
PI-FGSM(Ours) 70.7 100.0* 50.9 54.9 65.8
MPI-FGSM(Ours) 77.3 100.0* 56.5 63.7 64.3
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 84.3 100.0* 57.6 70.6 61.8
DMI-FGSM 89.0 100.0* 70.8 80.2 67.7
DMPI-FGSM(Ours) 90.4 100.0* 70.6 82.2 70.0
Res-152
FGSM 41.4 36.4 82.3* 32.0 45.1
I-FGSM 30.7 24.7 99.5* 16.9 23.7
MI-FGSM 56.1 51.0 99.5* 47.9 50.2
DI-FGSM 60.0 56.5 99.2* 49.3 43.1
PI-FGSM(Ours) 63.3 54.4 99.7* 50.6 67.4
MPI-FGSM(Ours) 68.8 62.5 99.7* 59.9 69.0
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 81.0 77.2 99.6* 75.0 71.6
DMI-FGSM 82.2 79.4 99.3* 74.8 72.0
DMPI-FGSM(Ours) 86.1 83.4 99.5* 82.0 75.2
IncRes-v2
FGSM 45.9 39.2 35.7 68.3* 45.6
I-FGSM 48.2 38.3 25.5 100.0* 27.0
MI-FGSM 77.6 68.4 57.0 100.0* 57.1
DI-FGSM 70.2 66.1 47.9 99.2* 42.0
PI-FGSM(Ours) 76.1 68.8 58.2 99.9* 69.8
MPI-FGSM(Ours) 80.2 75.5 63.8 100.0* 70.3
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 87.2 83.4 65.0 99.7* 69.2
DMI-FGSM 86.8 85.6 76.5 99.1* 70.9
DMPI-FGSM(Ours) 92.2 89.0 77.1 99.6* 74.7
This is because our perturbation patches have the property of aggregation, thus
reducing the impact of resizing. In particular, if we integrate PI-FGSM into
other attack methods such as DMI-FGSM, we can get a much better result. For
instance, the adversarial examples generated for IncRes-v2 by DMPI-FGSM can
fool Inc-v3 on 92.2% images in the black-box setting which also demonstrates
the vulnerability of NT.
4.5 Attacks vs. Defense Models
Our approach is especially effective for defense models. In this experiment, we
use EAT [34] and FD [36] to examine the transferability and we do not integrate
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Table 2. The success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks against EAT. The top row mod-
els are substitute models, we use them to generate adversarial examples by FGSM,
I-FGSM, DI-FGSM, MI-FGSM, TI-FGSM, PI-FGSM and their combined versions re-
spectively.
Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2
Attacks Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens
FGSM 16.8 15.8 8.3 16.6 17.2 9.1 21.4 19.4 11.4 18.6 17.5 11.2
I-FGSM 11.7 12.1 5.5 11.8 13.0 6.6 13.0 13.3 6.7 13.7 13.3 8.2
MI-FGSM 21.9 21.1 10.5 24.7 23.7 13.2 27.0 24.9 15.9 31.9 29.1 20.7
DI-FGSM 15.0 16.2 7.1 14.7 17.7 8.4 21.6 21.1 12.9 19.3 20.2 12.7
TI-FGSM 30.8 30.6 22.7 30.2 31.3 23.2 36.6 36.1 29.5 36.3 36.0 30.4
PI-FGSM(Ours) 39.3 39.5 28.8 40.3 41.8 31.4 43.0 45.0 34.9 46.4 48.4 42.4
TPI-FGSM(Ours) 49.1 50.2 36.5 49.6 51.7 38.5 51.5 51.4 43.3 59.2 60.3 56.5
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 40.9 41.6 31.2 43.4 46.0 33.8 47.9 48.5 41.4 48.8 50.4 45.8
DTMI-FGSM 50.7 50.3 39.5 54.0 54.2 42.9 59.5 58.4 53.1 65.4 63.8 62.9
DTPI-FGSM(Ours) 51.5 53.1 40.0 52.2 54.7 41.7 65.3 64.5 56.3 70.0 67.7 62.3
Table 3. The success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks. We use an ensemble of Inc-
v3, Inc-v4, Res-152, and IncRes-v2 to generate our adversarial examples by FGSM,
I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DI-FGSM, TI-FGSM, PI-FGSM, and their combined versions
respectively.
Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncResens ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D
FGSM 27.1 24.0 13.5 3.1 1.4 2.2
I-FGSM 26.2 25.2 16.0 0.7 0.8 0.4
MI-FGSM 51.9 49.3 32.9 2.8 1.8 2.2
DI-FGSM 40.5 38.5 25.6 1.2 1.5 1.2
TI-FGSM 39.3 38.9 31.5 6.1 3.7 3.0
PI-FGSM(Ours) 61.0 62.8 51.3 8.7 8.5 6.0
TPI-FGSM(Ours) 79.6 81.4 74.0 11.5 10.5 9.4
DPI-FGSM(Ours) 66.7 68.5 58.7 9.0 7.4 6.4
DTMI-FGSM 81.2 81.1 76.6 6.1 5.5 4.8
DTPI-FGSM(Ours) 89.3 89.2 83.4 11.7 10.6 10.4
the momentum term into our proposed PI-FGSM because it may hinder the
performance.
Here we study the single-model attacks firstly. In this case, we set β = 10
(γ = 16), and the results are shown in Tab. 2. Compared with TI-FGSM, the
average success rate of our method is improved by about 9.0%. In particular, if
we use DTPI-FGSM to attack IncRes-v2, 70.0% adversarial examples can fool
Inc-v3ens. Noted that the results of Tab. 2 are not our best parameter setting,
because the best kernel size for a single-model attack is not the same. Here we
just set the kw = 7 to keep the experimental parameters consistent.
The transferability can be greatly improved when the adversarial examples
are crafted for an ensemble of models at the same time [21]. It is because this
strategy can prevent adversarial examples from falling into a local optimum of
any specific model. In this case, we set β = 5 (γ = 8) and the result are shown in
Tab. 3. Compared with MI-FGSM, our proposed PI-FGSM improves the perfor-
mance by about 9.6% on average. Furthermore, compared with DTMI-FGSM
[3] which takes momentum into account, our DTPI-FGSM still outperform it.
Furthermore, when using Inc-v3 to attack against FD, we are surprised to
find that sometimes I-FGSM even perturbs misclassified images into correctly
14 L.Gao, Q.Zhang et al.
Table 4. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks. The top row models
are substitute models (“*” indicates white-box attack). We use ResNeXtDA, Res152B ,
Res152D and an ensemble of them to generate adversarial examples by FGSM, I-FGSM,
DI-FGSM, TI-FGSM, MI-FGSM, PI-FGSM, and their combined versions respectively.
ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D Ensemble
Attacks ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D
DI-FGSM 58.3* 34.4 33.3 33.5 57.3* 32.5 34.7 34.8 56.8* 67.0* 66.8* 65.9*
TI-FGSM 66.7* 44.5 44.6 46.9 69.8* 44.3 48.6 46.6 65.3* 63.8* 62.1* 63.1*
FGSM 67.2* 45.7 45.0 47.5 71.3* 45.4 49.2 46.3 68.4* 67.2* 67.1* 65.7*
DTMI-FGSM 72.1* 51.0 52.3 52.4 74.0* 49.1 54.4 51.8 69.8* 69.6* 68.3* 65.4*
DMI-FGSM 72.5* 50.3 50.8 49.8 76.0* 48.3 51.7 48.9 72.2* 71.7* 71.9* 71.3*
MTI-FGSM 72.6* 50.1 52.1 51.8 77.7* 49.7 53.5 51.2 73.8* 70.6* 71.3* 68.4*
MI-FGSM 79.0* 54.0 54.4 56.6 81.5* 55.0 57.1 54.8 78.5* 75.3* 77.1* 75.7*
I-FGSM 81.6* 55.1 55.9 56.8 83.7* 55.9 57.7 55.8 82.5* 78.9* 79.6* 79.8*
PI-FGSM(Ours) 86.9* 62.0 60.8 62.0 88.1* 61.9 62.7 62.4 86.6* 84.8* 82.5* 83.2*
classified ones (See Fig. 2). This may be due to the significant difference in
decision boundaries between the NT and FD. Since FD are very robust, and the
transferability largely depends on the substitute models. To make our proposed
PI-FGSM more convincing, we generate adversarial examples for ResNeXtDA,
Res152B , Res152D and an ensemble of them respectively. In this case, we set
β = 2.5, γ = 1. In Tab. 4, we sort these methods in an ascending order. As we can
observe, our approach is superior to other methods by a large margin for both
the white-box and black-box settings. However, existing methods’ performance
is even worse than I-FGSM, which is a basic iterative method. It also reminds
us that when attacking several robust defense models, simply combining with
different methods may not be effective.
5 Conclusions
Here we propose a novel patch-wise iterative algorithm – a black-box attack
towards mainstream normally trained and defense models, which differs from
the existing attack methods manipulating pixel-wise noise. With this approach,
our adversarial perturbation patches in discriminative regions will be larger,
thus generating more transferable adversarial examples against both normally
trained and defense models. Compared with state-of-the-art attacks, extensive
experiments have demonstrated the extraordinary effectiveness of our attack.
Besides, our method can be generally integrated to any gradient-based attack
methods. Our approach can serve as a baseline to help generating more transfer-
able adversarial examples and evaluating the robustness of various deep neural
networks.
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A Appendix
Here we discuss the influence of project factor γ and iteration T , we consider 12
models to do these experiments:
– NT: Inc-v3 [31], Inc-v4 [30], IncRes-v2 [30], Res-152 [9] and Dense-161 [10].
– EAT [34]: Inc-v3adv, Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 and IncResens.
– FD [36]: ResNeXtDA, Res152B and Res152D.
Then we report the results for different project factor γ settings in Sec. A.1 and
the influence of different iterations T in Sec. A.2.
A.1 Selection of project factor γ
In this section, we show the results of difference project factor γ settings. For
the following tables, the amplification factor β and project kernel Wp are fixed
to the same settings mentioned in Sec. 4. As shown in Tab. 5,6,7,8,9,10, setting
the project factor γ to /T · β is the best choice in most cases. Besides, it is
better not to use large project factor for attack methods with input diversity
strategy, and if we use Res152B as our substitute model to attack against feature
denoising models, setting γ to 1.0 is better.
Table 5. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project factor
γ settings. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by PI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 γ Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161 Inc-v3adv Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncResens Avg
PI-FGSM
1.0 39.2 28.7 33.8 36.5 24.2 13.7 12.8 7.1 24.5
2.0 42.1 29.6 37.9 38.2 25.2 13.5 14.0 8.4 26.1
3.0 42.1 28.2 35.2 38.9 25.0 16.0 14.2 8.0 26.0
4.0 42.8 29.9 39.7 40.8 24.9 15.6 14.8 9.0 27.2
5.0 46.1 31.3 40.3 42.7 26.1 16.4 17.0 8.1 28.5
6.0 48.4 31.8 40.9 44.4 27.1 18.1 16.7 9.8 29.7
7.0 50.9 34.7 44.0 45.5 26.5 18.8 17.9 10.0 31.0
8.0 53.1 36.2 45.5 46.6 28.5 20.2 19.7 11.7 32.7
9.0 52.8 35.3 45.3 49.8 28.7 21.6 21.7 13.3 33.6
10.0 53.2 36.9 48.8 52.5 28.5 22.1 23.3 14.8 35.0
11.0 55.8 39.9 49.6 53.4 30.0 26.7 27.2 17.0 37.5
12.0 55.7 40.9 50.8 55.3 29.8 28.1 29.7 18.7 38.6
13.0 57.4 41.7 50.3 55.6 32.1 31.2 31.5 22.7 40.3
14.0 57.8 44.7 51.4 58.3 35.3 34.1 35.0 25.8 42.8
15.0 58.5 44.3 52.3 59.2 38.6 37.1 36.8 26.9 44.2
16.0 59.8 46.9 52.7 60.2 40.7 40.2 39.7 29.6 46.2
A.2 The number of iteration T
In this section, we discuss the influence of different iteration T . Here step size
is set to /T , amplification factor β is set to T , and project factor γ is set to
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Table 6. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project factor
γ settings. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by DPI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 γ Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161 Inc-v3adv Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncResens
DPI-FGSM
1.0 72.9 48.6 64.0 49.5 24.7 15.5 14.4 8.4
2.0 73.0 50.4 65.2 54.7 26.2 15.4 15.6 8.6
3.0 73.2 50.9 66.6 60.6 26.4 16.7 17.7 9.1
4.0 70.1 49.0 62.1 60.3 25.9 17.5 15.8 9.1
5.0 66.0 48.7 59.4 61.1 27.8 17.3 19.1 10.6
6.0 62.7 47.9 54.7 61.6 27.7 18.0 19.9 9.5
7.0 61.8 46.0 52.0 61.8 28.8 20.8 20.4 11.4
8.0 58.2 45.5 47.8 59.2 30.4 21.8 23.8 12.0
9.0 55.2 43.7 47.8 58.7 29.9 23.2 23.4 13.0
10.0 53.9 44.6 46.2 59.1 31.1 26.0 26.4 16.5
11.0 53.8 44.3 44.6 57.6 31.2 26.9 29.7 17.9
12.0 55.2 42.5 45.3 58.7 33.3 30.4 32.7 19.0
13.0 52.2 43.5 43.5 58.1 34.8 33.4 34.6 22.9
14.0 55.3 41.7 40.8 59.0 37.0 35.0 35.9 26.4
15.0 52.1 40.9 41.1 56.8 40.8 39.8 40.1 28.6
16.0 51.9 43.5 41.5 57.9 42.3 40.9 41.6 31.2
Table 7. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project factor
γ settings. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by MPI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 γ Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161 Avg
MPI-FGSM
1.0 56.2 41.2 54.5 46.1 49.5
2.0 57.2 40.2 54.9 48.0 50.1
3.0 57.6 41.2 57.0 46.0 50.5
4.0 57.5 42.1 57.7 46.8 51.0
5.0 58.8 42.0 56.2 47.2 51.1
6.0 58.7 41.9 57.4 47.5 51.4
7.0 57.7 43.5 57.2 48.4 51.7
8.0 59.1 42.4 56.3 50.8 52.2
9.0 58.7 42.4 56.3 48.6 51.5
10.0 60.1 43.3 57.9 49.1 52.6
11.0 60.1 43.4 59.5 51.9 53.7
12.0 62.6 44.4 59.5 52.6 54.8
13.0 62.6 45.3 59.7 55.7 55.8
14.0 64.0 47.7 60.9 57.7 57.6
15.0 64.1 48.1 60.4 59.0 57.9
16.0 64.1 50.2 59.4 60.4 58.5
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Table 8. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project factor
γ settings. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by TPI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 γ Inc-v3adv Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncResens Avg
TPI-FGSM
1.0 32.8 29.7 31.0 20.9 28.6
2.0 32.0 31.2 31.6 22.2 29.3
3.0 34.0 31.4 32.2 23.0 30.2
4.0 34.0 32.7 34.0 22.6 30.8
5.0 34.9 34.3 34.7 23.4 31.8
6.0 35.3 34.7 33.6 23.1 31.7
7.0 35.8 35.8 36.1 24.4 33.0
8.0 37.9 36.4 37.5 25.9 34.4
9.0 36.4 37.0 38.3 26.5 34.6
10.0 38.6 38.0 38.2 26.6 35.4
11.0 38.0 40.9 40.3 27.1 36.6
12.0 40.4 41.6 40.2 28.9 37.8
13.0 41.8 42.8 43.3 29.7 39.4
14.0 43.8 44.0 44.7 32.9 41.4
15.0 46.6 46.6 47.0 34.8 43.8
16.0 50.2 48.8 50.8 35.2 46.3
Table 9. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project factor
γ settings. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by DMPI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 γ Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161 Avg
DMPI-FGSM
1.0 81.2 61.8 76.0 61.1 70.0
2.0 81.7 64.5 77.3 63.6 71.8
3.0 81.9 65.1 77.3 66.0 72.6
4.0 79.7 63.1 75.7 67.9 71.6
5.0 76.3 60.6 71.7 66.0 68.7
6.0 74.4 56.6 69.1 67.1 66.8
7.0 69.5 55.6 64.0 63.6 63.2
8.0 66.1 52.9 59.1 65.4 60.9
9.0 63.6 51.0 58.4 64.0 59.3
10.0 62.2 51.1 56.1 63.5 58.2
11.0 63.6 52.0 56.7 64.0 59.1
12.0 61.8 49.4 56.0 64.7 58.0
13.0 62.9 50.1 55.6 64.8 58.4
14.0 62.2 50.5 54.1 63.4 57.6
15.0 60.4 49.5 53.9 62.6 56.6
16.0 61.4 49.7 54.7 63.8 57.4
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Table 10. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different project
factor γ settings. Here we use Res152B (“*” indicates white-box attacks) to generate
adversarial examples by PI-FGSM.
Res152B γ ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D Avg
PI-FGSM
1.0 62.0 88.6* 61.5 70.7
2.0 62.1 88.2* 61.6 70.6
3.0 61.8 87.7* 62.0 70.5
4.0 61.5 87.1* 61.6 70.0
5.0 60.0 85.4* 58.8 68.1
6.0 56.8 84.0* 56.0 65.6
7.0 55.0 82.1* 53.4 63.5
8.0 53.4 80.7* 50.8 61.6
9.0 51.9 79.6* 49.0 60.2
10.0 50.9 78.7* 48.8 59.5
11.0 51.3 78.2* 48.6 59.4
12.0 50.8 78.0* 48.2 59.0
13.0 50.2 77.8* 48.0 58.7
14.0 50.3 77.8* 47.7 58.6
15.0 50.2 77.7* 47.7 58.5
16.0 50.2 77.7* 47.7 58.5
/T · β. From the results of Tab. 11,12,13, we observe that when the iteration T
exceeds 10, further increasing it will not bring significant improvement. Besides,
the computational cost is proportional to T . Since our PI-FGSM is based on
FGSM, we want to highlight “fast”. Therefore we do not consider a bigger T in
Sec. 4 and just set T to 10.
Table 11. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different iteration
T against NT. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by PI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 iteration T Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Dense-161 Avg
PI-FGSM
5 60.9 46.3 54.8 58.9 55.2
10 59.8 46.9 52.7 60.2 54.9
15 57.3 46.3 51.2 60.1 53.7
20 57.6 46.6 50.8 60.6 53.9
25 58.1 47.2 49.7 61.3 54.1
30 58.6 46.0 50.0 60.7 53.8
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Table 12. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different iteration
T against EAT. Here we use Inc-v3 to generate adversarial examples by PI-FGSM.
Inc-v3 iteration T Inc-v3adv Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncResens Avg
PI-FGSM
5 39.4 33.6 33.8 24.7 23.0
10 40.7 40.2 39.7 29.6 27.4
15 40.8 39.7 40.0 29.0 27.2
20 40.5 40.6 41.3 30.1 28.0
25 39.9 41.3 41.5 29.9 28.2
30 40.1 41.1 40.6 31.4 28.3
Table 13. The average success rate(%) of non-targeted attacks in different iteration
T against FD. Here we use Res152B (“*” indicates white-box attacks) to generate
adversarial examples by PI-FGSM.
Res152B iteration T ResNeXtDA Res152B Res152D Avg
PI-FGSM
5 60.0 86.8* 60.2 69.0
10 61.8 88.6* 61.5 70.6
15 62.6 89.3* 61.7 71.2
20 62.9 89.5* 61.9 71.5
25 62.8 89.5* 62.1 71.5
30 62.8 89.8* 61.5 71.4
